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Creativity vs quality: why the distinction matters when
evaluating computational creativity systems
Anna Jordanous1
Abstract. The evaluation of computational creativity systems is in-
creasingly becoming part of standard practice in computational cre-
ativity research, particularly with recent development in evaluation
tools. One matter that can cause confusion, however, is in distin-
guishing between the concepts of creativity and quality/value. These
two concepts are highly interrelated, to the point that it is difficult
(and perhaps inappropriate) to define creativity without incorporat-
ing quality judgements into that definition. Several examples exist,
however, where creativity evaluation has been confused with quality
judgments, leading to less grounded evaluative results. Many compu-
tational creativity projects aim to produce high quality results; this is
a worthy research aim. If, however, the aim of a computational cre-
ativity research project is to make as creative a system as possible,
then a more careful approach is needed that acknowledges and un-
derstands the differences - and also the overlaps - between creativity
and quality. This paper critically investigates the concepts of creativ-
ity and quality (and how they are related). It offers warning examples
showing the dangers of conflating the two concepts. These are fol-
lowed by practical examples of how to incorporate value judgements
into the evaluation of creativity of software, to further our overall
pursuit of building more creative computational systems.
1 introduction
There is a distinction to be drawn between the aim of evaluating cre-
ativity or evaluating quality (Section 3); as the survey of evaluative
practice in Section 3.1 showed, these aims have become blurred to
some extent.
How does one evaluate the creativity of a computer system? It can
be attractive to sidestep this issue somewhat, evaluating the quality
of a system’s output rather than creativity.2 As a result, though, sys-
tem development progresses towards more successful output, but not
necessarily more creative output. Perhaps this is what is desired? But
if the aim of a computational creativity research project is to make
a creative system, then a more careful approach is needed that ac-
knowledges and understands the differences (and the overlaps) be-
tween creativity and quality.
This paper specifically tackles the above aim, investigating at how
researchers can navigate the distinction between creativity and qual-
ity, in pursuit of building more creative computational systems.
Section 2 investigates the meaning of ‘quality’, the meaning of
‘creativity’ and the ways in which these two concepts are intercon-
nected. These investigations are carried out looking at both human
and computational creativity. Section 3 tackles the question of how
1 University of Kent, Medway, UK, email: A.K.Jordanous@kent.ac.uk
2 The distinction between the evaluative aims of creativity and quality is
raised in Section 3.1.
these concepts should be handled when performing evaluation of
computational creativity systems, reflecting on relevant ‘good, bad
and ugly’ previous evaluative practice. The paper concludes with the
take-homemessage that while quality forms a key part of creativity, it
is not a direct substitute. To evaluate creativity, we must incorporate
evaluation of quality, but not treat evaluation of quality as a sufficient
proxy for evaluation of creativity.
2 Quality, creativity and the connections between
them
2.1 Quality is...
The concept of quality, as treated in this paper, is highly related to its
synonymous concepts of value as well as its near-synonyms of util-
ity, usefulness, appropriateness, correctness, fit, relevance, and effec-
tiveness. During this paper I will occasionally use quality and value
interchangeably to represent the overarching concept of something
having some worth.
Quality judgements represent the value that something has to at
least one observer. As in [1], the word ‘value’ can be treated either
as a noun or as a verb, i.e. the action of valuing; and value is not re-
stricted to commercial or quantitative measurements, but also to cul-
tural and qualitative assessments of value. Such judgements can be
affected by societal contexts and influences, as discussed for example
by Wiggins et al. in their considerations of how value is manifested
in creative contexts:
‘we treat value as a relation between an artefact, its creator and
its observers and the context in which creation and observation
take place.’ [38, p. 2]
It is difficult to find domain-independent heuristics to follow when
ascertaining the value of products. Usefulness is relative; what is con-
sidered useful in products of one domain is not necessarily repro-
duced in the other and may not apply equally across that individual
domain. Wiggins et al [38] note in particular how Western perspec-
tives may differ from non-Western perspectives.
To recognise the usefulness of a creative product, one might know
the product’s domain well enough to appreciate value, or one might
have access to the opinions of people who are experts in that do-
main. To exemplify this point, and to begin to link quality with cre-
ativity: the greatest contributor to creativity in musical improvisation
has been found to be the social communication and interaction that
happens between musicians, or between performer(s) and audience
during the creative process of improvising [10, 7]. Specifically for
creativity, improvisers prioritise this over the quality or ‘correctness’
of the music produced during improvisation. In mathematical proof
derivation systems, however, accuracy (and hence quality, which is
strongly related to accuracy in this domain) is vital.
Zongker’s paper entitled Chicken Chicken Chicken: Chicken
Chicken [39] demonstrates how the perception of quality in a partic-
ular domain is not always consistent across all examples of creativity
in a domain. Chicken Chicken Chicken shows quality, in a domain
that emphasises content correctness (scientific research papers), be-
cause of the extreme absence of any scientifically useful and correct
content. Instead the quality of Chicken Chicken Chicken: Chicken
Chicken comes from its value as an ironic and humorous reflection
on academic publications.
2.1.1 Evaluating quality achieved by computational
creativity systems
Various approaches have been used to evaluate quality; ranging from
relatively simple quantitative metrics of the validity or correctness of
products (as discussed below), to those more tricky evaluative sce-
narios when qualitative, multiple, complex or non-objective metrics
are required to judge quality, as discussed for example in the [9] as-
sessment of the cultural value of electronic musicians’ creative work.
In a 2011 survey of evaluation practice in computational creativity
[6, 7] (see also Section 3.1, evaluations of quality of the surveyed
systems3 were typically based on aspects of the end product(s) rather
than any of the other Four Ps: process, person/producer or press
(see [8]). While many examples were found of empirical measure-
ments of value or quality, as described below, several systems were
assessed for quality through user evaluations. Evaluation data was
either directly provided by the user or provided indirectly through
studies, such as through audience reactions and feedback at exhibi-
tions or through qualitative tests with target users for usability and
effectiveness of the system. Feedback about the appeal of systems’
products and personal preferences about the products was also pro-
vided through user evaluations.
Many systems were evaluated by the correctness and validity of
their products, such as calculating the percentage of material pro-
duced during runtime that can actually be used, or statistical tests
for validity. Some systems were measured in terms of how interest-
ing or novel their products were, for example seeing if the products
performed at a level above a given threshold for novelty and original-
ity in the Wundt curve function [29] or using variables representing
domain-specific interest or complexity measurements.
The usefulness of a system’s products could also be quantified,
through the percentage of a user query which is satisfied by system
output [22], or the percentage of results that are valid. Human ratings
of usefulness were also used. Usefulness ratings were not all quan-
titative, with use of post-implementation discussions on usefulness
or the interpretation of value as serving an intended purpose. Other
definitions of quality were highly tuned to domain-specific metrics
for value, making them less generally applicable across several types
of creative system or for a more general discussion.
2.2 Creativity is...
It is difficult to define creativity without bringing quality into the def-
inition: the concept of quality is heavily used when defining what cre-
ativity is. Psychology research has settled on a slightly controversial
3 Here I consider quality of a system to be treated pragmatically based on how
it performs, but acknowledge that software quality in its own right, encom-
passing software engineering and code quality, would also be an alternative
interpretation of the title of this section.
but now fairly commonly accepted ‘standard definition of creativity’
[28]:
‘The standard definition is bipartite: Creativity requires both
originality and effectiveness. ... Originality is vital for creativity
but is not sufficient. ... Original things must be effective to be
creative. ’ [28, p. 92]
Here the word ‘effectiveness’ is used to represent the concept re-
ferred to in this paper as quality or value, as explained by Runco and
Jaeger during the discussions in [28].
Prior to the publication of [28], the quality (and related concepts:
value usefulness, appropriateness, relevance) and novelty (and re-
lated concepts: originality, newness) of creative products have often
been identified as the two main aspects of creativity. Creativity was
being defined in computational creativity research as ‘how to create
something new and useful at the same time.’ [21, p. 290] Similar
definitions were widely adopted e.g. in [20, 21, 27] in computational
creativity, and e.g. [14, 30, 3, 23] in psychological research into cre-
ativity. Mayer [14] refers to this combination as the ‘basic definition
of creativity’ [14, p. 450]. Table 22.1 of [14], reproduced here in Ta-
ble 1, summarises the ‘Two Defining Features of Creativity’ [14, p.
450] as used in [30].
In a 20044 survey of 34 definitions of creativity used in creativity
research [24], the survey found that:
‘The most common characteristics of explicit definitions were
uniqueness (n = 24) and usefulness (n = 17). Of interest, all
17 articles that included usefulness in their definition also men-
tioned uniqueness or novelty.’ [24, p. 88]
Table 1. Mayer’s summary of how novelty and value (or highly related
concepts) are used to define creativity by different authors in various
chapters of Robert J. Sternberg’s influential Handbook of Creativity [14,
(Table 22.1, p. 450)], in [30].
Author (Chapter) Feature 1: Originality Feature 2: Usefulness
Gruber & Wallace (5) novelty value
Martindale (7) original appropriate
Lumsden (8) new significant
Feist (13) novel adaptive
Lubart (16) novel appropriate
Boden (17) novel valuable
Nickerson (19) novelty utility
It is questionable whether the combination of novelty and value is
enough to understand creativity [12]. This reductionist approach pro-
vides two tangible attributes with which to evaluate creativity. Work
in computational creativity has produced countless systems that pro-
duce novel results that have value; but still the notion that computers
can be creative is resisted. This undefinable part of creativity is re-
flected in Weiley’s coining of creativity as ‘novelty, value and “x” ’
[32]. As argued in [11], there is much more to consider in terms of
what creativity is, that the combination of novelty and value alone
does not incorporate.
In dictionary definitions of creativity, the word ‘quality’ is one
of the more frequent words used, as is ‘new’ (excluding common-
use English words such as ‘the’, ‘and’, and so on) ([7], see also the
word cloud in Figure 1). However this word cloud reveals many other
4 This 2004 survey by [24] predates the above-mentioned work by Runco et
al [28] defining their ‘standard definition’ of creativity.
words relating to creativity other than ‘quality’ and ‘new’. Jordanous
and Keller [11] empirically identified 14 key components of creativ-
ity through the analysis of multi-disciplinary discussions of the na-
ture of creativity. These components do include Value, as well as
Originality, but also components such as Active Involvement & Per-
sistence, or Spontaneity & Subconscious Processing. Nonetheless, it
is almost universally agreed that the concept of quality, incorporat-
ing the notions of value and usefulness, is a necessary component of
creativity.
Before concluding this section, I briefly acknowledge an inciden-
tal point that connects quality and creativity in the scientific study
of creativity (of which computational creativity forms a part). An in-
teresting subjective objection to the scientific study of creativity is
whether it may have a detrimental effect on our sense of the ‘marvel-
ling’, ‘awe and delight’ of creativity:5
‘Forget computers, for the moment: the conviction is that any
scientific account of creativity would lessen it irredeemably. ...
[There is a] widespread feeling that science, in general, drives
out wonder. Wonder is intimately connected with creativity. All
creative ideas, by definition, are valued in some way. Many
make us gasp with awe and delight. ... To stop us marvelling
at the creativity of Bach, Newton, or Shakespeare would be al-
most as bad as denying it altogether. Many people, then, regard
the scientific understanding of creativity more as a threat than
a promise.’ [3, pp. 277-278]
3 Evaluative aims: creativity or quality?
An issue that researchers often face when evaluating their system is:
Should systems be evaluated solely on the value and correct-
ness of their output, or should there be some assessment of
the creativity demonstrated by the system (which incorporates
quality judgements on the output)?
Both are important, though the quality of output is often easier to
define and test for, especially in the absence of a standard definition
or creativity evaluation methodology. Particularly for computational
creativity research, though, it is as important to consider to what ex-
tent a computational creativity system can actually be considered cre-
ative [7, 5].
It is becoming easier for computational creativity researchers to
specifically target evaluation of the creativity of their systems, due to
the development of evaluation tools. Creativity evaluation methods
such as SPECS [7], Creative Tripod [5] or Ritchie’s criteria [27] are
starting to become more widely used in practice in computational
creativity.
No one methodology has yet been adopted as standard, however.
Historically, a 2011 survey of practice in computational creativity
evaluation [6, 7] revealed issues in conflating judgements of creativ-
ity and quality during evaluation which did not follow these eval-
uation methods. This survey, of which the most relevant parts are
reported below, investigated various questions about evaluation prac-
tice of creative systems, including these questions:6
• Evaluation details:
– Is system evaluation mentioned at all in the paper?
5 Perhaps appropriately, it is difficult to debate this point scientifically but it is
worth being aware of this point, as scientific researchers studying creativity
6 For the full list of questions included in the survey, see [7].
– Has a system evaluation been performed and described in the
paper?
– Do the authors state the aims of their evaluation and/or their
evaluative criteria?
– Is the main aim of evaluation to assess creativity (including
quality of output/system) or (just) quality of output/system?
– Brief description of evaluation done.
From the 75 surveyed creative systems in Section 3.1, only 35% of
systems were evaluated according to how creative they were; the rest
of the systems were evaluated solely by the quality of the system’s
performance. Two systems [25, 4] were described as being assessed
for creativity but were actually assessed only on the accuracy of the
system.
Of the 18 papers making practical use of creativity evaluation
methodologies such as Ritchie’s criteria [27] or Colton’s Creative
Tripod [5], only 10 papers used the methodologies for creativity eval-
uation, with the rest adapting the methodologies to evaluate the qual-
ity of their system output.
This shows some confusion about the distinction between creativ-
ity and quality; as this paper investigates, our interpretation of cre-
ativity includes reflections on quality but encapsulates more than just
how correct or valuable the creative output is. A pertinent example of
such confusion can be found in [31]: Ventura aimed to critically anal-
yse creativity evaluation methodologies via a thought experiment. but
actually addressed quality (or ‘recognisability’) evaluation only.
3.1 Survey findings
75 systems were reviewed during this comprehensive survey of com-
putational creativity literature at the time. Results relevant to this pa-
per are summarised in [6, 7]. Looking at the 75 surveyed systems for
information relevant to this current paper:
• Of the 75 programs presented as creative systems, 26 systems
(35%) were critically discussed in terms of how creative they
were.
• 32 systems (43%) were evaluated based on the quality or accuracy
of system performance compared to a human performing that task.
This set of 32 systems includes 3 systems which were described as
being assessed on how creative the systems were, but which were
actually assessed by the quality of the system’s performance.
• 1 paper evaluated its system in terms of knowledge gained for
future research.
• The remaining 16 papers did not include evaluation of the system.
The survey also revealed interesting details from 18 papers that
applied recognised creativity evaluation methodologies [5, 27, 2] or
creativity models [3, 36], or that proposed new metrics to evaluate
their creative systems. Of the 18 papers that applied recognised cre-
ativity evaluation methodologies:
• 10 papers used the methodologies to measure how creative their
systems were.
• 6 papers adapted the chosen method to measure the quality of the
systems.
• 2 papers used ‘creativity’ methodologies that actually measured
quality.
Figure 1. Words used in various dictionary definitions of creativity, as analysed in [7]. The font size of a word is relative to the frequency with which that
word occurs in the collection of dictionary definitions; the larger the word, the more it appears. The word ‘quality’ appears fairly prominently, but does not
overly dominate the diagram.
4 Using quality judgements as part of an
evaluation of computational creativity
Often, as seen in the above-mentioned survey, creative systems have
often been evaluated with regard to the quality of the output and this
has been used to justify that system being described as creative by
the authors. The discussions below first look at exemplar scenarios
where such evaluation has been done due to a confusion between the
two concepts of quality and creativity, then turn to discussing how
quality judgements have been consciously and justifiably incorpo-
rated into evaluation of creativity.
4.1 Confusion between creativity and quality in
computational creativity evaluation
The overlap between creativity and quality can sometimes cause con-
fusion as to how to evaluate creativity; this is perhaps unsurpris-
ing given the many issues manifest in evaluating creativity of com-
putational systems [7]. One representative example, taken from the
systems surveyed above, sees a so-called creativity metric proposed
which actually evaluates quality, but which is used to generate evi-
dence justifying a system being labelled a creative system.
Collins et al. [4] employ the Wilcoxon’s two-sample statistical test
on their music harmonisation generator. The metric examines simi-
larity between generated output and the system’s knowledge base.
Despite Collins et al. describing their test as a creativity metric, they
actually measure how closely the system can replicate the test set
(similar to the approach in [34]). In other words, in [4] what is actu-
ally proposed is a correctness metric rather than a creativity metric,
a distinction which they briefly acknowledge as they admit a lack of
conviction in describing their system as creative:
‘This paper has presented a metric for evaluating the creativity
of a music-generating system. Until further evaluation has been
conducted (by human listeners rather than just by the creativity
metric), we are cautious about labelling our overall system as
creative.’ [4, p. 9]
Another example of this confusion is clear when we ask people
to evaluate the creativity of computational systems; expressions of
the difficulty of this task is often acknowledged by recognition that
the evaluators do not know where a creativity judgement is distinct
from a value judgement. For example, in the case studies reported in
[7] where several systems were evaluated on how creative they were,
quotes from respondents included:
‘I liked this one better than the other ones, but am re-
ally struggling to distinguish between “like” or “approve” and
“think it’s creative”.’
‘I kept going with my gut instinct which was basically to
rate it on how much I *liked* it... but I don’t think that re-
ally equates to how creative it was... but I’m not even sure a
computer *can* be creative, which is why I had to just keep
reverting to “like”.’
‘I think it depends on the definition of creativity - is it just
creating something? or creating something that makes the ap-
propriate amount of “sense”, for want of a better word, for peo-
ple to appreciate? I’m using the latter definition!’
There are deeper issues afoot here than mere confusion, to do with
people’s perception of computational creativity.7 One evaluator in the
[7] evaluation case studies explained how they struggled with apply-
ing the concept of creativity to computers when they saw creativity
as ‘a uniquely human thing’. Thus, they instead resorted to a concep-
tually easier measure of aesthetic, even though they were aware of
the difference, concluding:
‘I preferred these samples to the previous ones, but that isn’t
really a measure of creativity!’
7 This thorny topic will not be explored in this current paper, but is explored
to some extent in [7] as well as in [15, 13, 16].
4.2 Conscious incorporation of quality evaluation
in creativity evaluation
The blurring of evaluative aims, between assessing quality and cre-
ativity, is a theme that is detectable not only in [4], but also in sev-
eral computational creativity system evaluations.8 Several evaluation
tools in computational creativity, however, consciously include qual-
ity evaluation as part of a creativity evaluation for creative systems.
This is in keeping with the view that quality or value is a fundamental
component of creativity [28, 11].
4.2.1 Ritchie’s empirical criteria for computational
creativity
Graeme Ritchie proposed a set of formal empirical criteria for cre-
ativity [27]. The criteria are situated in an overall framework describ-
ing the design and implementation of a creative computational sys-
tem in set-theoretic form. Ritchie advocates post-hoc analysis of arte-
facts generated by the system, disregarding the process by which they
were created. For systems that produce abstract rather than concrete
results (Ritchie gives the example of analogies), Ritchie’s approach
is not applicable.
The criteria collectively describe aspects of the typicality and qual-
ity of the output of the creative system (and indirectly, the novelty of
the system output). Two key mappings are used to separate out the
concepts of typicality and novelty:
typ - a rating of how typical the output is in the intended domain
‘To what extent is the produced item an example of the arte-
fact class in question?’ [27, p. 73]
val - a rating of how valuable the output is
‘To what extent is the produced item a high quality example
of its genre?’ [27, p. 73]
Ritchie emphasises the importance of assessing computer-
generated artefacts both in terms of how typical an example they are
of items in the target domain and in terms of atypicality. Further to
this, an artefact may be typical of the domain but not be a good ex-
ample, so the value rating is introduced to assess the quality of that
artefact.
‘If a person produces a painting which is radically different
from previous work ... and which is definitely a good painting,
then that will usually be deemed creative. ’ [26, p. 4]
The formal definitions of the 18 criteria can be found in [27].
Here, the criteria are deliberately presented informally, with descrip-
tors such as ‘suitable’ and ‘high’ substituted for the parameters left
unspecified in [27]. It is hoped that any subsequent loss in formal
semantics is balanced by a more immediate understanding of each
criterion. We can see that while Ritchie allows for both typical and
atypical results to be recognised by the criteria, criteria involving
value judgements are always required to find high levels of value if
that criterion is to be satisfied.
1. On average, the system should produce suitably typical output.
2. A decent proportion of the output should be suitably typical.
3. On average, the system should produce highly valued output.
4. A decent proportion of the output should be highly valued.
8 In fact, encountering such examples during peer review duties was one of
the prompts to write this paper.
5. A decent proportion of the output should be both suitably typical
and highly valued.
6. A decent proportion of the output is suitably atypical and highly
valued.
7. A decent proportion of the atypical output is highly valued.
8. A decent proportion of the valuable output is suitably atypical.
9. The system can replicate many of the example artefacts that
guided construction of the system (the inspiring set).
10. Much of the output of the system is not in the inspiring set, so is
novel to the system.
11. Novel output of the system (i.e. not in the inspiring set) should be
suitably typical.
12. Novel output of the system (i.e. not in the inspiring set) should be
highly valued.
13. A decent proportion of the output should be suitably typical items
that are novel.
14. A decent proportion of the output should be highly valued items
that are novel.
15. A decent proportion of the novel output of the system should be
suitably typical.
16. A decent proportion of the novel output of the system should be
highly valued.
17. A decent proportion of the novel output of the system should be
suitably typical and highly valued.
18. A decent proportion of the novel output of the system should be
suitably atypical and highly valued.
4.2.2 Pease et al.’s tests on the input, output and process of
a system
[20] proposed a combination of evaluative tests for creativity, based
on:
• The input provided to the system.
• The output produced by the system.
• The process(es) employed by the computational system.
The tests for the output produced by the system are categorised
by Pease et al. as either Novelty Measures or Quality Measures. The
latter set of quality measures consists of:
• Quality Measures.
– Emotional Response Measure: human judges evaluate to what
degree an item has affected them positively or negatively; the
responses are used to categorise items according to the intensity
of the response.
– Pragmatic Measure: using unspecified (domain-specific)
‘marking criteria’ [20, p. 6] to judge to what extent an item
meets an aim.
The tests for the process(es) employed by the computational sys-
tem are divided into two sets: tests of generative processes and tests
of evaluative processes within the systems. The evaluation set of tests
includes a test based around a quality judgement:
• Evaluation of Process Measure: comparing the quality measures
from above on two comparable sets of output items. One set is
produced by methods which can be transformed internally during
program run-time and one by methods which cannot. The quality
of the first set should exceed the quality of the second.
As in Section 4.2.1, these tests are summarised in informal lan-
guage above.9
4.2.3 Wiggins’ framework for categorising creative systems
Wiggins proposed a framework for categorising creative systems [37]
inspired by Boden’s proposals on creativity [3]. Strictly speaking,
this framework is for formal description and classification of differ-
ent aspects of creative system, rather than evaluation of creativity, but
has been used in computational creativity evaluation.
Though the framework is intended to be used to ‘analyse, evaluate
and compare creative systems’ [36, p. 1], Wiggins carefully states
that he does not contribute to the debate on creative evaluation:
‘I am making no attempt here to discuss or assess the value
of any concepts discovered: while this issue is clearly funda-
mentally important [citing [3, 26, 17]], it can safely be left for
another time.’ [37, p. 453]
The framework describes system details formally according to
seven formal rule sets and functions relating to the system’s con-
ceptual space (i.e. the set of all possible items that could conceivably
be output by the system). One of these rulesets, E , is the set of rules
used to evaluate items in the conceptual space. This set, as with the
others, is left to be populated as the framework is applied for cate-
gorising creative systems.
Looking at Wiggins’ immediate subsequent work as a guide for
how to populate this set, Wiggins and colleagues have tended to focus
on quality evaluation rather than creativity evaluation [34, 19, 33].
In particular [19]’s melody generation system was evaluated using
a variation of Amabile’s Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT)
[2], intended by Amabile for evaluating the creativity demonstrated
by humans in a quantitative way by expert judges. CAT was adapted
slightly in [19] to assess the quality of output (‘stylistic success’)
from their system rather than the creativity of the system itself. This
decision was perhaps influenced by the authors’ substantial back-
ground in musical quality evaluation e.g. [35, 17, 36, 18, 37].
5 CONCLUSION
Distinguishing between creativity and quality is a tricky task to ne-
gotiate when we are evaluating the creativity of computational cre-
ativity systems. The two concepts overlap considerably; in fact it is
generally accepted that creativity cannot be defined without incorpo-
rating the concept of quality into that definition. The two concepts
are however not to be confused; an evaluation of value is distinct
from an evaluation of creativity.
Above, examples have been presented where such confusion in
evaluation has led to less-than-solid conclusions about the results of
such evaluation. We have also seen, however, that creativity evalua-
tion can (and should) incorporate evaluation of quality as part of that
overall evaluation. Quality is a necessary part of creativity; but it is
not sufficient for creativity.
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